Assertions made by some that the president has the power under the 14th Amendment to unilaterally lift the debt ceiling to avoid economic catastrophe are misleading, mischievous and contemptuous of constitutional principles.

Such an attempt by the president would unconstitutionally expand the sweeping powers already possessed by the executive, usurp the powers and responsibilities of Congress, and further relieve the legislature of accountability to the Constitution and the American people. It is a remedy that rivals the disease.

At issue is the text of the 14th Amendment, which states that "the validity of the public debt of the United States authorized by law shall not be questioned." The clear purpose of the provision - prohibiting Congress from repudiating the national debt - was directed to Congress, not the president. To its credit, the Obama Administration has consistently denied executive power to raise the debt ceiling.

"The Constitution gives Congress - not the president - the authority to borrow money, and only Congress can increase the debt ceiling," said Jay Carney, the White House press secretary.

Oblivious to the mischievous implications for the separation of powers of the prerogative authority that they urge, advocates of a presidential spending power invoke as justification the concept of emergency or inherent executive powers. It is difficult to identify a concept more contemptuous of constitutional principles than the assertion of an amorphous executive "emergency" power.

Justice Robert H. Jackson, in his famous concurring opinion in the 1952 Steel Seizure Case that rebuffed the Truman Administration's claim of "inherent emergency powers," observed that the framers of the Constitution had rejected the concept of a presidential emergency power since they supposed that the possession of such authority "would tend to kindle emergencies."

Some scholars have wrongly argued that certain of President Lincoln's actions in the Civil War were justified because of exigent circumstances. Lincoln exceeded his constitutional authority in responding to the emergencies generated by the war, but he sought and received from Congress retroactive authorization for his extra-legal claims. He did not assert executive authority to violate the Constitution.

Attribution to the president of authority to raise the debt ceiling would eviscerate the Congressional spending authority. The last thing America needs at this moment in its history is further expansion of executive power, already traveling a trajectory of unlimited power, the netherworld of constitutionalism. Allowing for presidential spending power, moreover, would facilitate continued Congressional abdication of its constitutional responsibilities.

It is true that Congress is failing to discharge its duties. The framers, however, believed authority over legislation, spending and war-making must rest in the legislature, not in the executive, if republican principles are to be preserved.

David Adler is the Director of the Andrus Center for Public Policy at Boise State University, where he holds appointment as the Cecil D. Andrus Professor of Public Affairs.